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Dialog with Trypho and the Myth of Er

Recently in this place began a discussion where was examined by what faculty, if any, man might perceive God, assuming God to be both benevolent in wishing Man to see Him, and omnipotent to accomplish that at which He aimed. One side argued that such a God would provide abundant evidence to the senses of Man so as to quell all honest doubt, and that since no such evidence existed, such a God’s existence, or His providence, was in doubt. The other argument was that God, a spirit, both of necessity (since spirits are invisible) and of His providence (since it is less open to doubt, and more readily available to all men, including the blind and unlettered, than either empirical proofs or formal logic) reveals Himself to those who seek Him directly and not through the medium of the sense impressions.

Without revisiting that argument, I note with amusement that it is an old one. Here, for example, from circa 135 A.D. is Justin Martyr, my namesake, the patron saint of philosophers, discussing the purpose of philosophy, and the conclusion of Plato that the divine nature hidden in man allows men to perceive God directly, though the mind, much at other mental forms are perceived. He is debating an old man, not otherwise named, who (later in the dialog) leads him to doubt the wisdom of the philosophers.

‘Are you, then, a lover of words’ said he, ‘but no lover of deeds or of truth? and do you not aim at being a practical man so much as being a sophist? ‘

‘What greater work, ‘said I, ‘could one accomplish than this, to show the reason which governs all, and having laid hold of it, and being mounted upon it, to look down on the errors of others, and their pursuits? But without philosophy and right reason, prudence would not be present to any man. Wherefore it is necessary for every man to philosophize, and to esteem this the greatest and most honourable work; but other things only of second-rate or third-rate importance, though, indeed, if they be made to depend on philosophy, they are of moderate value, and worthy of acceptance; but deprived of it, and not accompanying it, they are vulgar and coarse to those who pursue them.’

‘Does philosophy, then, make happiness? ‘ said he, interrupting.

‘Assuredly, ‘ I said, ‘and it alone.’

‘What, then, is philosophy? ‘ he says; ‘and what is happiness? Pray tell me, unless something hinders you from saying.’
‘Philosophy, then, ‘said I, ‘is the knowledge of that which really exists, and a clear perception of the truth; and happiness is the reward of such knowledge and wisdom.’

‘But what do you call God? ‘ said he.

‘That which always maintains the same nature, and in the same manner, and is the cause of all other things-that, indeed, is God.’ So I answered him; and he listened to me with pleasure, and thus again interrogated me:-

‘Is not knowledge a term common to different matters? For in arts of all kinds, he who knows any one of them is called a skilful man in the art of generalship, or of ruling, or of healing equally. But in divine and human affairs it is not so. Is there a knowledge which affords understanding of human and divine things, and then a thorough acquaintance with the divinity and the righteousness of them?’

‘Assuredly, ‘I replied.

‘What, then? Is it in the same way we know man and God, as we know music, and arithmetic, and astronomy, or any other similar branch?’

‘By no means, ‘I replied.

‘You have not answered me correctly, then, ‘he said; ‘for some [branches of knowledge] come to us by learning, or by some employment, while of others we have knowledge by sight. Now, if one were to tell you that there exists in India an animal with a nature unlike all others, but of such and such a kind, multiform and various, you would not know it before you saw it; but neither would you be competent to give any account of it, unless you should hear from one who had seen it.’

‘Certainly not, ‘I said.

‘How then, ‘he said, ‘should the philosophers judge correctly about God, or speak any truth, when they have no knowledge of Him, having neither seen Him at any time, nor heard Him? ‘

‘But, father, ‘said I, ‘the Deity cannot be seen merely by the eyes, as other living beings can, but is discernible to the mind alone, as Plato says; and I believe him.’

My comment: with the same pleasure that one spots an old friend in a crowd in a foreign city, I am bemused to spot this Indian animal alike no others. That Second Century animal is none other than the "China teapot in orbit" of Bertrand Russell, used as an example of those things not seen whose existence the believer, and not the doubter, has the burden of proof to establish.

I should mention that the Old Man in the dialog goes on to question Plato’s conceit:

‘Is there then, ‘says he, ‘such and so great power in our mind? Or can a man not perceive by sense sooner? Will the mind of man see God at any time, if it is uninstructed by the Holy Spirit? ‘

‘Plato indeed says, ‘replied I, ‘that the mind’s eye is of such a nature, and has been given for this end, that we may see that very Being when the mind is pure itself, who is the cause of all discerned by the mind, having no colour, no form, no greatness-nothing, indeed, which the bodily eye looks upon; but It is something of this sort, he goes on to say, that is beyond all essence, unutterable and inexplicable, but alone honourable and good, coming suddenly into souls well-dispositioned, on account of their affinity to and desire of seeing Him.’

‘What affinity, then, ‘replied he, ‘is there between us and God? Is the soul also divine and immortal, and a part of that very regal mind? And even as that sees God, so also is it attainable by us to conceive of the Deity in our mind, and thence to become happy? ‘
‘Assuredly, ‘I said.

‘And do all the souls of all living beings comprehend Him? ‘he asked; ‘or are the souls of men of one kind and the souls of horses and of asses of another kind? ‘

‘No; but the souls which are in all are similar, ‘I answered.

‘Then, ‘says he, ‘shall both horses and asses see, or have they seen at some time or other, God? ‘

‘No, ‘I said; ‘for the majority of men will not, saving such as shall live justly, purified by righteousness, and by every other virtue.’

‘It is not, therefore, ‘said he, ‘on account of his affinity, that a man sees God, nor because he has a mind, but because he is temperate and righteous? ‘

‘Yes, ‘said I; ‘and because he has that whereby he perceives God.’

‘What then? Do goats or sheep injure any one? ‘

‘No one in any respect, ‘I said.

‘Therefore these animals will see [God] according to your account, ‘says he.

‘No; for their body being of such a nature, is an obstacle to them.’

‘He rejoined, ‘If these animals could assume speech, be well assured that they would with greater reason ridicule our body; but let us now dismiss this subject, and let it be conceded to you as you say. Tell me, however, this: Does the soul see [God] so long as it is in the body, or after it has been removed from it? ‘

‘So long as it is in the form of a man, it is possible for it, ‘I continue, ‘to attain to this by means of the mind; but especially when it has been set free from the body, and being apart by itself, it gets possession of that which it was wont continually and wholly to love.’
‘Does it remember this, then [the sight of God], when it is again in the man? ‘

‘It does not appear to me so, ‘I said.

‘What, then, is the advantage to those who have seen [God]? or what has he who has seen more than he who has not seen, unless he remember this fact, that he has seen? ‘

‘I cannot tell, ‘I answered.

My comment: I have similar reservations, with all due respect to the Hindu and New Agers and others who support it, with the doctrine of reincarnation, or successive reincarnation. Here is the quote from Plato about the Myth of Er, and it leads me to wonder what justice (or even sense) there is in Orpheus living as a swan, Thamyras a nightingale, Ajax a lion or Achilles an eagle.

…There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey.
There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former tolls had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it….

My comment: Of course, perhaps the amnesia is meant to have a medicinal effect, since Plato quite clearly says their own unforgiving nature leads them to don the lives of beasts. If they cannot forgive, they must drink of the waters of oblivion, and forget. Odysseus is wise enough to seek reincarnation, not as a high-caste Brahmin, but as a humble workingman. The passage has a mystical humility to it.

Let my close by quoting St. Justin Martyr on more time. I will not tell you how closely this passage reflects both my own sentiments, and my own experience. (The ‘Theoretics’) mentioned below are possibly the Cynics of Diogenes.)

Philosophy is, in fact, the greatest possession, and most honourable before God, to whom it leads us and alone commends us; and these are truly holy men who have bestowed attention on philosophy. What philosophy is, however, and the reason why it has been sent down to men, have escaped the observation of most; for there would be neither Platonists, nor Stoics, nor Peripatetics, nor Theoretics, nor Pythagoreans, this knowledge being one.
I wish to tell you why it has become many-headed. It has happened that those who first handled it and who were therefore esteemed illustrious men, were succeeded by those who made no investigations concerning truth, but only admired the perseverance and self-discipline of the former, as well as the novelty of the doctrines; and each thought that to be true which he learned from his teacher: then, moreover, those latter persons handed down to their successors such things, and others similar to them; and this system was called by the name of him who was styled the father of the doctrine.
Being at first desirous of personally conversing with one of these men, I surrendered myself to a certain Stoic; and having spent a considerable time with him, when I had not acquired any further knowledge of God (for he did not know himself, and said such instruction was unnecessary), I left him and betook myself to another, who was called a Peripatetic, and as he fancied, shrewd. And this man, after having entertained me for the first few days, requested me to settle the fee, in order that our intercourse might not be unprofitable. Him, too, for this reason I abandoned, believing him to be no philosopher at all. But when my soul was eagerly desirous to hear the peculiar and choice philosophy, I came to a Pythagorean, very celebrated—a man who thought much of his own wisdom. And then, when I had an interview with him, willing to become his hearer and disciple, he said, ‘What then? Are you acquainted with music, astronomy, and geometry? Do you expect to perceive any of those things which conduce to a happy life, if you have not been first informed on those points which wean the soul from sensible objects, and render it fitted for objects which appertain to the mind, so that it can contemplate that which is honourable in its essence and that which is good in its essence?’ Having commended many of these branches of learning, and telling me that they were necessary, he dismissed me when I confessed to him my ignorance. Accordingly I took it rather impatiently, as was to be expected when I failed in my hope, the more so because I deemed the man had some knowledge; but reflecting again on the space of time during which I would have to linger over those branches of learning, I was not able to endure longer procrastination. In my helpless condition it occurred to me to have a meeting with the Platonists, for their fame was great. I thereupon spent as much of my time as possible with one who had lately settled in our city,—a sagacious man, holding a high position among the Platonists,—and I progressed, and made the greatest improvements daily. And the perception of immaterial things quite overpowered me, and the contemplation of ideas furnished my mind with wings, so that in a little while I supposed that I had become wise; and such was my stupidity, I expected forthwith to look upon God, for this is the end of Plato’s philosophy.
About

John C. Wright is a practicing philosopher, a retired attorney, newspaperman, and newspaper editor, and a published author of science fiction. Once a Houyhnhnm, he was expelled from the august ranks of purely rational beings when he fell in love; but retains an honorary title.

October 30, 2009 @ 1:25 pm
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