The Paradoxes of Radical Empiricism
Question Four: (Quoting me) “It is a paradox to claim that there are no foundational and unchanging truths, since that claim itself is unchanging and foundational.” What if I said “It is more pragmatic to inform action with reference to changing facts, rather than unchanging truth”? In the same way I cannot prove souls don’t exist, but when predicting the behavior of other people, it’s more useful to think of their memories and brain chemistry.
Pragmatic is the word usually used to mean that, given a certain end, when two means or paths exist to reach that end, the means combining the smaller effort with the greater chance of success or degree of reward or both is to be preferred. Is this the way you are using the word?
If so, this rewording does not escape the paradox. You are making the claim that it is less costly to inform action based on the changeable factors, what we call the variables, than based on the unchangeable factors, what we call the constants.
A single example with disprove the general rule. Suppose two cases. Two rational beings, a man and a woman, have some possession you desire. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the woman is smaller and weaker of the two.
In the first case, you win the possession from the man by an honest trade in return for some recompense from you, or because he makes a generous gesture that requires your gratitude in return.
In the second case, you win the possession from the woman by theft or by violence, under such conditions where there is no real possibility of her retaliation, as no one will avenge her. In this second case, you saved the expense of any recompense and are excused of the burden of gratitude for her generosity. By any measure, it is both less expensive and more likely to succeed.
The possession in both cases is the same. The rational nature and innate human rights in both cases in the same. Those are the constants.
The only thing that is different is that the woman is smaller and more easily robbed than the man. Those are the variables.
The fact that robbery and theft is wrong is the same. The moral truth in both cases is the same.
Now, if your comment means only that there are times, such as when you want to commit a robbery, when it is pragmatic, that is to say, easier, to ignore rather than obey the conscience, then you are saying nothing very surprising. All temptations are phrased this way.
On the other hand, if your comment means that moral laws should be ignored on the grounds that laws, by the very fact that they are unchanging no for no other reason, then you are uttering the same paradox again using different words.
The law which says “Disobey all unchanging law” is itself an unchanging law.
A statement which says “It is sometimes pleasant or efficient to disobey the unchanging law” is not a law at all. Such a statement indeed is nothing but a comment showing why laws exist. If to obey the law were the same as to act in whatever fashion was most pleasing to our senses or most economical for our expenditure of time and effort, then there would be no law. Duty would equal pleasure not in rare cases, but in all cases.
Question Five: As for empirical fact, how about this: “Only by citing by empirical fact can [one] sway my opinion on a given matter”?
If you are offering this statement in order to prove the truth of the thing stated, there are only two possibilities. Either your statement here is an empirical statement or it is a formal statement.
1. If it were a formal statement, your statement reads as follows: “There are two abstract classes. One is called ‘fact’. The other is called ‘persuasive power’. I submit no members outside the class ‘fact’ are inside the class ‘persuasive power’ or, in other words, no non-‘fact’ equals ‘persuasive power’.”
This is a paradox because it is not an empirical statement, and yet something persuaded you to believe it. The first statement is in fact a statement of epistemology.
Stated briefly, it is the statement “Only empirical evidence proves truth.” But if only empirical evidence proves truth, then the statement that only empirical evidence proves truth is unproved or is untrue.
2. In order for your statement to be an empirical statement, it would have to read as follows: “There are two objects currently within the range of my perception. One object is called ‘fact’. The other object is called ‘Persuasive power.’ The physical properties of these two objects, when compared against a third object such as a yardstick or a stopwatch recognized as a measurement for those properties, shows the physical properties to be the same. ‘Fact’ has the same mass, length, duration, temperature, current, candlepower, and moles of substance as ‘persuasive power’. Therefore the two objects are the same.”
Now, this version of the statement is simply meaningless. When you say “only facts have persuasive power” you are not making an empirical statement after a fashion of someone who says “The melting point of iron is higher than the melting point of water ice.” You are not making a statement that, if I doubt the statement, you can place before my eyes some physical object or event I can measure, or some experiment I can perform, to confirm the truth of what you are saying.
But all the foregoing assumes you are offering the statement as proof for the thing asserted.
If you are offering this statement only as a report of the psychological or historical condition of your own mind at this time, then the statement reads as follows, “To the best of my information, memory and belief, it just so happens that I personally have never been persuaded by any abstract argument resting on abstract principles, axioms, or general statements. The only thing I can recall that has ever persuaded me is an empirical argument that recited specific empirical facts relating to specific events in the past.”
This statement is an empirical statement in the broad sense of the term, meaning a statement concerning the past. It does not have any bearing on the future: even if the statement is perfectly honest, it is not necessarily true that you were once persuaded by an abstract argument you have since forgotten, or that you will be persuaded by an abstract argument next year, next week, or in the next minute of your experience.
If so, the statement has no persuasive power. You are merely reporting on a sad lapse of memory and a psychological inability to recognize the persuasive power of arguments that have in the past and will in the future persuade you. There is certainly no reason for me or anyone else hearing the statement, including you yourself ten days or ten minutes from now, to be persuaded to follow your example, and ignore abstract arguments about universals.
It is the same as a Benedict saying he has never fallen in love, or Teresias saying he never saw a full moon: it has no bearing on whether or not we should be persuaded that true love and full moons do not exist.
About John C Wright
John C. Wright is a practicing philosopher, a retired attorney, newspaperman, and newspaper editor, and a published author of science fiction. Once a Houyhnhnm, he was expelled from the august ranks of purely rational beings when he fell in love; but retains an honorary title.
