Predetermined to Reject Predeterminism
I am the last person on earth to contribute a wise comment to the discussion of freewill vs determinism (or predestination, or any variant thereof) for the simple reason that I do not think the two incompatible.
I do not think the paradox everyone else sees in the question actually exists. I am what is called a “Compatibilist.”
Free will is a legal category: namely, whether or not a man is liable for his own actions. Dogs and children do not have free will, nor to madmen, as they are not fit to stand trial.
Determinism is a ontological category, or, rather, a categorical error: namely, Determinism mistakes the ontological category of might-have-been (i.e. an event which could have come about, but did not) with the category of is-not (an event which never could have come about).
The legal category and the ontological category have nothing to do with each other.
When a man is faced with a fork in the path, if he takes one, the other is behind him. After the fork is passed, the path not taken is no longer an option. In a sense, it does not exist, because it is not present, real, and current.
In another sense, it does exist, as a lost opportunity, a path not taken, a might-have-been.
Unicorns do not exist, but nothing about a one-horned ruminant is innately impossible. Four-sides triangles do not exist by definition.
Likewise, the parallel version of history where George Washington lost the Revolutionary War does not exist, but such a version is not only possible, but, given the situation at the time, but was actually rather likely.
These two senses in which the unreal and impossible “do not exist” are not the same, albeit we have no clear and easy way of depicting the difference in English. The first does not exist, but could have; the second does not exist, and could never have.
Determinists say these might-have-beens do not exist. I argue that this is nonsense, a confusion of the concept of possibility and probability.
Probability means how many trials out of a hundred lead to a similar result.
Possibility means one might take one path of two.
Determinists reason that if someone who knows the man at the fork in the road, let us say it is his wife, knows full well which path he will take, because he gave his word, and she is certain of his character, that the untaken path does not exist and never did exist, if she correctly foretells he will not take it. She knows his character: He is a man of honor. The possibility of him taking the wrong path, and breaking his word, is zero: out of a hundred trials in previous similar circumstances, he always took the righthand path.
The man has the ability, each time out of a hundred times passing by the lefthand path, of changing his mind and walking down it. The ability exists whenever the fork is before him. That she is certain, absolutely certain, he will use the ability in the way she expects, does not rob him of the ability.
Now let us suppose a time traveler visits George Washington on Christmas Eve of 1776. He knows full well Washington will attempt the dangerous crossing of the Delaware River by night: and yet he sees the man pray and ponder. It is quite clear Washington is making the decision.
More to the point, it is quite clear Washington is legally liable for his brave actions, whether praiseworthy or blameworthy. If the night attack is successful, he gets the lauds and praise. If captured and hanged, he is guilty of the treason against the Crown. Washington is the one who decided on that fateful night to cross or not to cross.
The Time Traveler knows most certainly as a matter of historical fact which decision Washington has made, did make, will make. Being a Time Traveler, if he lands his time machine in an hour before the decision is made, he knows the decision before Washington himself does.
What is the probability that Washington will have, could have, or would have decided otherwise? Technically speaking, the question is meaningless, because we do not have one hundred trials of similar circumstances to see whether the results would be similar. The crossing of the Delaware is a unique event.
However, in common speech, we do not make so precise a distinction between probability and possibility. A possibility is something that could have happened, but did not. In this case, Washington has the power not to decide whether to cross or not to cross: both paths are open to him. The Time Traveler knows for certain that this power to decide not to cross is one Washington will not exercise. That is a path he will not take. But he could have. The fact that he did not exercise the power at this moment, he did not decide to retreat, does not eliminate the fact that the decision was his.
Now let us suppose God Almighty seat on his omniscience throne at the center of eternity foretells the outcome of all events springing from creation before the word of creation is spoken. George Washington is still lauded for his praiseworthy acts. He might have been hung for treason, but was not. God surely is aware of what will be: but why is the Divine Mind not also perfectly well aware of what might have been, and did not come to pass?
The characters in the books I write must have free will, or else they are not characters. But I know how the story ends before I take pen to paper. Unless they surprise me.
About John C Wright
John C. Wright is a practicing philosopher, a retired attorney, newspaperman, and newspaper editor, and a published author of science fiction. Once a Houyhnhnm, he was expelled from the august ranks of purely rational beings when he fell in love; but retains an honorary title.
