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The Parable of the Puff of Air

Posted April 14, 2021 By John C Wright

Reductionist materialism, also called eliminative materialism, is the proposition that no substance other than matter can or could exist.

The basic argument, first proposed, if memory serves, by Descartes, is that the universe is composed of two substances, mind and matter, which are separate, but connected at the pineal gland. Other philosophers, from this basis, argued that the separation was absolute, and kept in apparent harmony by monads or divine providence, not of their own nature. In later days it was argued that without a substance in common, the two could not interact, nor be kept in harmony. Therefore there can be only one substance.

The materialist holds that this one substance is matter. The idealist come to an opposite conclusion, but that is a discussion for another day.

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The Notorious Meat Robot Letters – Expanded!

Posted May 7, 2015 By John C Wright

In my last column in this space, I invited Malcolm the Cynic, and any other reader who cared to contribute, to debate the fascinating issue of whether atheism logically necessitates to nihilism. The challenge was either to prove or disprove that a non-nihilist atheist was a logical contradiction in terms.

To my immense surprise, not one, but many contributor began debating an unrelated issue, (and one I personally find deadly dull) namely, whether reductionist materialism, also called panphysicalism, necessitates nihilism.

I will not take the time to answer any such arguments now.

The topic, for me, was years ago sapped of all joy, and the philosophical curiosity of my buoyant yet naive youth beaten slowly yet cruelly out of my aching brain by an endlessly repeated blows of sheer hooey and dreary nonsense while I very slowly and very painfully discovered that panphysicalism is not really a legitimate and thoughtful position held by legitimate and thoughtful people, but a messy ashcan of random slogans, lame excuses, utter blither, and general crackpottery held by neurotics who cannot follow a simple syllogism of three steps.

I admit the possibility that perhaps somewhere a sane panphysicalist exists, a man who can give a rational argument defending the position, but I have yet to meet him, or read his words.

Until I meet such a chimera, I place panphysicalism, as a metaphysical theory, in the same category Marxism occupies for economic theory: that is, a mere insolent denial of the very discipline allegedly being investigated.

Those interested in a detailed, absurdly detailed, examination of my thoughts and reasoning on the matter are invited to examine as much of the record as they can stomach.

Below is the list.

I post the list to show that the topic has been sufficiently discussed to the point where I see no need to revisit the question until, if ever,  a new argument is introduced. Or I should say, a line of argument.

If someone wishes to prove that atheism in and of itself necessitates panphysicalism, he is welcome to produce the proof and show the steps of his reasoning.

Until then, I reject any identification of atheist, which is an honorable, if mistaken, philosophical posture, with panphysicalism, which is self-refuting Alice-Through-the-Looking-Glass nonsense, akin to a man saying he can prove his own non-existence, right after he proves that proofs never work and that words have no meaning.

I am not asking anyone to help me refute panphysicalism. I have done so over fifty times.

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Goedel and Panphysicalism

Posted May 9, 2014 By John C Wright

And now a moment for arid philosophy! Because I know my readers don’t want me just to talk about Space Princesses!

If materialism is true, that the universe is like a machine with programming or like a system of logical statements one following from the next as in geometry. There is nothing in the universe which is not defined, determined, or caused by anything other than a material cause. Hence the chains of cause and effect in the universe are exactly parallel to the logical formal causes of a machine following its programming or a system of logical statements following their assumptions. This means that everything, everything, everything in the universe is exactly the same as a line of code in a computer program, a set of cogs in a clockwork, a set of proofs in a system of geometry.

By Goedel’s argument, there is no set of proofs in a system of geometry which is both universal and determined. Determined means you can tell whether it is true or false. Universal means that all proofs in the set of proofs are proved.

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Lost in the Garden of Forking Paths

Posted September 25, 2013 By John C Wright

Despite the imposition on the patience of my loyal readers. I would be DELIGHTED for the opportunity to discuss this particular paradox of philosophy with someone (anyone) other than Dr Andreassen. I will say only that he has no interest in this kind of conversation, and that his persistence puzzles me. I intend no further answers to him.

A reader with the explosive name of Plutonium writes in with a cogent and coherent argument in favor of materialism.

Let examine the propositions:

1. All non-agent physical systems are physically decomposable into particles.

If by non-agent physical systems you mean dead bodies in motion, things like stars and atoms and clocks; and if by ‘decomposable’ you mean the one thing can be described and defined entirely in terms of the other thing with nothing left over and nothing unexplained, then yes. I agree with this without reservation.

2. All non-agent particles(particles not in an agent system) interact with other particles in specific, deterministic(Only one outcome) fashions.

If by this, you mean that dead bodies in motion, things like stars and atoms and clocks, given the same initial positions and moved by the same external forces will end up in the same end position in two different trials, then yes. I agree without reservation.

“1 and 2 are just the normal ‘physics’ assumptions. Tell me if you think these are bad.”

No, I am happy to speak with someone who seems to know what the normal assumptions of physics are. If you start telling me that Newton can predict Newton’s thoughts with mechaNewton, and that normal physics can measure beauty and checkmate and the width of the imaginary line dividing the sea from the sky at the horizon, I will strangle myself with that imaginary line.

3. The physical component of an agent system is physically decomposable into the same particles as the non-agent case.

If we restrict our case to the physical components only, then yes, albeit obviously the deterministic element falls out of this equation at this point.

4. These particles obey the same rules in the non-agent case as in the agent case.

Concerning external forces acting on the living body if it happens to be case where the deliberate and the non-deliberate body would react the same way, then yes. Various chemical reactions, molecular actions, gross physical motions such as the speed with which a man falls off the Leaning Tower of Pisa versus a wax mannikin, yes, all these are the same.

This seems to imply materialism (or effective materialism) to me.

I do not see why. There is some unspoken assumption you are making that I am not, or visa versa. Let us see if we can discover what it is.
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One more time, Sysiphus

Posted September 24, 2013 By John C Wright

Trapped in the Purgatory of an Endlessly Repeated ongoing conversation:

Dear Dr Andreassen, Out of a spirit of charity, despite the fact that you will not hear me this time any more than you heard me the last countless number of times, I will explain again.

I never disagreed with the idea that atomic motions can be predicted. That idea is absurd.

You say I did disagree. I assume this is because you classify the deliberate motions of Shakespeare’s body to be an atomic motion. In your words ” To wit, you disagreed that the motion of Shakespeare’s atoms can be predicted using only physical information. Which is not the same as saying they can’t be predicted, period…”

Your article of faith (it is not a position you have ever defended, only asserted) is that in the same way a carbon-14 atom in the stomach of Shakespeare has a rate of decay that can be predicted, or has four covalent bonds to form predictable chemical compounds, in just such a way as that, the motions of his pen hand and hence whether the play is a tragedy or comedy can be predicted.

Your thought is not only in error, it is unrelated to reality. No one in physics has ever put forward a theory of animate motions of playwrights. Physicists, including Newton, have put forward theories of celestial and atomic motions. Indeed, it was Newton’s great contribution to science that he combined the theory of ballistics, collisions  and planetary motion in to one theory of gravity.

So, you are arguing only that the motions of the hand are predictable in principle.

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On the Impossibility of Empirical Metaphysics

Posted September 14, 2013 By John C Wright

More of the same. This time, with no pictures of the Catwoman.

But then, on the hypothesis that parallel Newtonian universes are possible, how do I avoid drawing the implication that such universes that start out physically identical will continue to play out physically identically so long as the matter in them obeys Newton’s laws?

By examining the unspoken assumption being made. In real physics, as opposed to the make believe physics of materialism, the physicist assumes the past physical events define or determine present physical events as a metaphysical assumption, that is, as a the starting unquestioned axiom of his discipline. He discipline does not apply to people or animals and never has and never will and does not even pretend to do so.

Materialism, on the other hand, is a philosophical rather than a scientific theory, and starts from the axiom of ontological monism, or, in layman’s terms, the laws which apply to matter also must apply to the mind since there can only be one substance in the universe since the universe is one coherent whole. To posit two substances destroys the axiom of coherence.

So you ask about a Newtonian universe. We live in a Newtonian universe. Newton’s laws are a correct approximation for how matter behaves at speeds not near the speed of light. It is less accurate than Einstein’s theory or Quantum Mechanics, and they in turn are less accurate than a unified field theory, if such is ever developed.

Am I being clear? All physical theories BY DESIGN are partial theories. They explain the physical aspects of the universe and nothing else.

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The Last Post on this Topic for a While

Posted October 23, 2012 By John C Wright

Darrell says:

Mr. Wright, if I recall rightly, refers to himself as a compatiblist (a determinist who believes in free will – a position that I thought Dr. A held as well, but I am now uncertain) and believes in an “underlying reality” for which BOTH physical and mental descriptions apply while neither is able to do so fully and sufficiently without the other. To provide an analogy, if one person only sees a car crash and another only hears a car crash then neither witness can fully describe the crash. Nor did hearing the crash did cause what the one witness saw anymore than seeing the crash cause what the other witness heard.

I suspect that Mr. Wright is quite possibly a monist, or at least someone that would argue that we are unable to observe what the underlying reality “really” is. If this is so, and I stand ready to be corrected, then the underlying disagreement is what is reality composed of? Do we have access to observing this underlying reality?

Well, well. It will sound snarky, but I have been waiting for two years to see if anyone would actually ask me what I thought on this topic. You are all too shy (or have too much good sense).

The question is exactly what is reality composed of. That is the basic question of ontology. It is a question I have now asked Dr Andreassen an even dozen times to address, and he has now given an answer, which as a curt refusal accompanied by an unconvincing face-saving justification. Enough of him.

The question of whether monism implies an unobservable buried reality, however, is fascinating. My answer would either be a qualified yes or a definite maybe.

Oddly enough, Amelia Windrose in my ORPHANS OF CHAOS trilogy is asked exactly this question, and replies that she believes in monads, but that she cannot explain how the physical dimension of the monad relates to the mental dimension of the monad. It cannot be a physical relationship, like a gravity field, because then a brick would have to have the concept ‘brick’ attracted by gravity and connected to it; it cannot be a symbolic or mental relationship because then the physical brick would have to have the concept ‘brick’ producing or manifesting it the way a mind produces an imagination or a god produces an avatar. So she said the concept was unanswerable.

At the time I made it up, I meant it for a clever bit of science fictional reasoning, but seeing how this conversation is trending, now I am not so sure.
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Seeking Closure on the Closure Discussion

Posted October 23, 2012 By John C Wright

Bel Roise once again asks a question to attack the Foundation of my philosophy. Okay, not really, but I could not resist the pun.

Time permits me at the moment only to reply to one remark in his long and thoughtful response:

I was merely asking how can it be that qualia, which I know to be real and which we both agree are not reducible to physical facts, can move objects or -perhaps I should put it this way-, how can objects in the physical move in such accordance to qualia?

When you see a woman with whom you are in love, the loveliness of the beloved draws you, sets your soul in motion, and is the final cause, the purpose or goal, of the various acts of courtship and valor by which the brave deserve the fair. Agreed? This is motion, but it is not physical motion. It is a cause, but it is not a mechanical cause. The photons bouncing off the bouncy young girl are not pushing the suitor to go pick flowers and scribble bad poetry with means of and only by means of the mass-energy of the photon. Photons of a similar mass and energy coming from a flashlight have never produced a single ode.

Your question is ambiguous, in that you are actually asking about ’cause’ in the sense of ‘purpose’ or ‘goal’ or ‘inspiration’ or ‘aspiration’ but you are using the word ’cause’ in the sense of a mechanical lever applying external pressure to an inert and animate body.

Because these words are the same in English, and because all our metaphors and words for mental events are the same words we use for physical events, it is nearly impossible in our thoughts to make and maintain this distinction, even though the distinction clearly exists in reality.

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On the Necessity of Ontology

Posted October 22, 2012 By John C Wright

A reader apparently named after a famous admiral from Trantor bent on destroying The Foundation, Bel Riose, asks an interesting question, but also cautions us not to the ongoing and endless conversation about materialism to reach its ontological and axiomatic foundations.

“I honestly cannot understand why you guys keep insisting in skipping ahead and talking about ontology when there are relevant questions about physics and questions about the physical reality that Dr. Andreassen is asking but which no dualist in this space, as far as I have traced back this discussion, has been willing or able to answer concisely and clearly.

To follow Mr. Wright’s suggestion I will use the exact philosophical terms: is there physical closure? is there nomological closure in the physical reality? what is the -physical- nature of the interaction between the mind and the physical reality? does this interaction necessarily implies that the laws of physics are nondeterministic or violates said closures?

With all due respect, another set of elaborate metaphors explaining how mental objects and physical objects belong to different categories and therefore cannot interact is not a satisfactory answer and I doubt it is going to be very helpful for any skeptic such as myself. Dualism must solve the problem of interaction.”

I am frankly baffled that anyone calls the solution unsatisfactory. It solves the problem and there is nothing left over to explain and no questions left unasked. if my solution is unsatisfactory, please tell me what you imagine a satisfactory solution would look like?

With all due respect, no, it is simply not true that Dualism must solve the problem of interaction before turning to a discussion of ontology, or indeed, at all. There is no problem of interaction.

All this is  assuming you would classify me as a Dualist. Perhaps I am, perhaps not. I believe mind and body differ in substance, by which I mean they are not talked about in the same terms or categories, but I am not a Cartesian.

I  would call myself an Accommodationist: my contention is that the use of statements about the mechanical causes of motion or material causes of matter to explain the physical aspects of reality neither confirm nor contradict the use of formal and final causes and categories to explain the nonphysical aspects. They accommodate each other. I hold that the appearance of a conflict is an illusion created by the misuse of words and metaphors.

From my point of view, Dualism has no business solving the problem of interaction before discussing ontology because Monism must first prove that there is a problem of interaction to be solved.

This is exactly where the conversation breaks down: the Monist Materialist seems to be saying that the Dualist is saying immaterial thoughts are a type of mechanical cause which creates physical force that pushes a bit of matter. The Dualist says he is not saying that.

What Dualism and Monism are really discussing is ontology, the question of whether mind and body exist, or exist in the same sense of the word ‘existence’ and how the two relate to each other, if at all.

If my thesis for the last two years has been “there is no problem of interaction to solve because there is no such thing as this so-called interaction” it is worse than useless to announce that the “problem of interaction” must first be solved before the conversation can move on.

To ask us to discuss the mind-body relation without discussing ontology is like asking use to discuss the Theorem of Pythagoras without reference to geometry.

Now, the reason why I say there is no problem of interaction to be solved is because this is a conclusion of my theory of ontology. If you agree with my theory of ontology, then you must agree with my conclusion about the illusory nature of the so called problem of interaction. But I cannot argue that the so called problem of interaction is illusory until and unless I argue the theory of ontology.

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The Same Inescapable Topic Yet Again

Posted October 18, 2012 By John C Wright

A reader who has far more patience for this long dead topic than it deserves asks:

 I believe that the question that Dr. Andreassen has been trying to ask with the convoluted Mechaspeare thought-experiment is, do immaterial things impact the trajectory of material things? So, for example, if Shakespeare were sitting at a desk and we had the God-like power to instantly analyze the entire physics of the universe would we absolutely know what he would physically do next?

If we would, Dr. Andreassen concludes, then there is no need believe in immaterial things as they add nothing to predictive power. If we wouldn’t, Dr. Andreassen concludes, then in theory, and at some point in the future, physicists could develop an experiment to show that immaterial things exist. He then is interested in how the immaterial things change the trajectory of material things.

I solemnly assure you that I understand the purpose and point and every nuance of Dr Andreassen’s hypothetical. We have flogged that particular horse of conversation to death and then with additional whip strokes torn the carcass from the bones.

The original conversation consisted of very few exchanges, and then month after month after month of impasses, where neither side said or could say anything new.

His disagreement with me is metaphysical, and since does not believe metaphysical questions are meaningful, he can neither ask nor answer meaningful questions about his position.

It was a question I answered two years ago, and again every few months since.

My answer is and was this: Immaterial things do not suffer physical motion from material things nor impart physical motion to material things. Only material things impart physical motion to material things.

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From the Archives: Parable of the Chessman

Posted October 16, 2012 By John C Wright
This article appeared in February of this year, and originally appeared the year previous. An inattentive reader made the unlikely claim that I was reluctant or unable to answer the question addressed here. I reprint the article as a reminder that I suffer from the opposite problem; namely, a chivalrous (or, perhaps, a neurotic) inability to stop discussing the issue even after it is clear that discussion is futile.

Parable of the Chessmen

I have been asked whether the electrons in a brain move “according to” the laws of physics as opposed to moving “according to” the willpower of the thinker.

The question is ambiguous because there are two meanings of “according to.” The dichotomy proposed by the question is a false one — the choice is not between a brain-electron moving “according to” (meaning 2) someone’s will OR moving “according to” (meaning 1) the laws of Newton.

Note the differences here between a proscriptive and a descriptive use of the phrase “according to”. If I shake my head to signify a negative, that is according to my will and according to the convention that a head-shake means ‘no’. That is proscriptive, in accord with a final cause. If Jack Ketch chops my head with an ax, the fall of my head into the basket is “according to” Newton’s laws of gravity. That is descriptive, in accord with a mechanical cause.

The head might indeed make the same motion, but asking for an account of the mechanics is not the same as asking for an justification for my refusal.

It is not an ‘either-or’ question.

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The Challenge of the Ultimate Prime Number

Posted October 5, 2012 By John C Wright

Andreassen characterizes my previous discussions with him concerning eliminative materialism (the doctrine that nothing but matter exists) in this way:

I am happy to present the evidence and argument that convinced me, if only we could get past the jeer of “Meat robot!” that silences all serious discussion of the point.

Sir, if the only thing halting serious conversation on this topic is alleged untoward antics on my part, let me ask you ten questions on the topic. I make no statements and propose no arguments, and leave you free to answer however you will. They are questions, pure and straightforward.

Question One: Is there or is there not an Ultimate Prime number? That is to say, is there a prime number of which there is no higher number on the number line which is also a prime?

If there is no Ultimate Prime, is there an infinity of primes, such that given any prime number there is always another prime number higher than it?

Question Two: If you know the answer to question one, by what means do you know it?

Did you make an observation with your eyes at a particular time and place; or did you make a deduction from axiomatic first principles; or do you know the answer by some other means?

Question Three: If you made an observation at a particular time and place of the infinity of primes, please tell me where and when you stood, and what you looked at, so that I may look at this infinity of numbers with my own eyes for myself, and count them as you have done, and so confirm your observation.

If on the other hand, it is not an observation, is it something known by deduction from self evident first principles?

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More of the Same

Posted September 4, 2012 By John C Wright

Part of an ongoing conversation. Nostreculsus writes:

Mr wrf3 is making an interesting claim.

Imagine that radio antennae pick up a series of radio signals – intervals of activity (above a certain threshold) alternating with periods of radio silence. It can be transcribed as a sequence of ones and zeroes. If the sequence is long enough, we can ascertain its statistical properties. Hence we can measure its degree of disorder (its entropy).

The information per symbol and the distribution of information throughout the sequence are therefore measurable physical properties. But Mr wrf3 goes one step further. He quotes Douglas Hofstadter approvingly and claims that we can deduce the “inherent meaning, i.e. where the symbols alone [are] enough to convey their meaning” purely from the message. We can tell if it is a message and not some natural phenomenon.

Isn’t this akin to the claim of those who believe in “intelligent design”? They assert that by measuring the complexity of DNA sequences they can decide whether or not the sequence is designed. But Mr Wright contends that “Meaningfulness is not a material property.”

Let me stipulate that the sequence is not a transmission directed from the space aliens to us. So there is no allusion to areas of common knowledge: no lists of primes or encoded star maps. If it is a message, it is an intercepted signal from one group of aliens to another, discussing some alien topic. But we can download as much of it as we wish.

So, I ask, how does the intrinsic meaning of a sequence “emerge” from its bare material description?

Mr wrf3 asked me to be rude to him when I was trying my best to be polite by being aloof from his flippant snipes and dishonest accusations. He seemed to think my courteous reserve was funny, and he mocked it by daring me to be rude to him, saying it would amuse him. I thought the rudest thing I could do was ban him, which I have. Perhaps he is amused, perhaps not.

If any reader can find a way to argue his position perhaps more clearly than he did, I am happy to reply.

Before we begin, let me state my basic thesis.

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The Argument Against Materialism

Posted February 27, 2012 By John C Wright

In case anyone who is interested has not understood the basic argument against materialism, let me give it in a syllogism.

My argument is that anything which cannot even theoretically under any conditions whatsoever in this universe or any other be described in literal material terms, using words that only refer to material properties, is not material.

The mind (or, for that matter, words as opposed to ink marks in the book) cannot even theoretically under any conditions whatsoever in this universe or any other be described in literal material terms, using words that only refer to material properties.

Therefore the mind is not material.

(And even if it were, since we cannot refer to it (therefore not think about it) in words except those which tacitly treat the mind as immaterial (words like “form” or “pattern” or “intent” or “meaning” or “embed” or “refer to” or “involved with” or “logic gate” or “either-or”) we would still have to talk and think about mental thinks using the categories and terms of final cause and formal cause, that is, as if it were non-material.)

That is my argument. It is in modes ponens. So far, no one has actually made an argument against it.To make an argument against it, it is not enough to state an opinion that the conclusion is false; one must challenge, that is, give evidence that the major or the minor premise is false, or, at least, not sufficiently clear as to compel belief.

All they have done is made the assertion that thoughts are material, and this is done, always and without exception, by describing thoughts in material metaphors, saying that thoughts are little balls or sparks of energy pushed by other balls or sparks of energy — and then, always, always, always, adding some word that refers to non-physical reality, like ‘symbol’ or ‘refers to’ or ’embed’ or ‘pattern’ or refers to non-physical abstractions such as logical or mathematical objects.

I’ve been arguing this for years, decades, and I have yet to hear an argument which does not rest on a subtly or transparently ambiguous definition conflating mental and physical properties, such as using the word “brain” to refer both to the mind and the brain, or using the word “word” to refer both to the ink marks on the page (the physical aspect of the word) and to the meaning of the word (the mental aspect).

 

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From the Archives: Parable of the Chessman

Posted February 15, 2012 By John C Wright

I thought it timely to reprint this article from last year, since the topic has apparently surfaced again. Italic text is new, where dated material was edited.

Parable of the Chessmen

A materialist asks whether the electrons in a brain move “according to” the laws of physics as opposed to moving “according to” the willpower of the thinker.

The dichotomy proposed by the materialist is a false one — the choice is not between a brain-electron moving “according to” (meaning 2) someone’s will OR moving “according to” (meaning 1) the laws of Newton.

Note the differences here between a proscriptive and a descriptive use of the phrase “according to”. If I shake my head to signify a negative, that is according to my will and according to the convention that a head-shake means ‘no’. That is proscriptive, in accord with a final cause. If Jack Ketch chops my head with an ax, the fall of my head into the basket is “according to” Newton’s laws of gravity. That is descriptive, in accord with a mechanical cause. The head might indeed make the same motion, but asking for an account of the mechanics is not the same as asking for an justification for my refusal.

It is not an ‘either-or’ question.

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