Evidence and Self-Evidence
Part of an ongoing discussion. A reader with the divinely affectionate name of Theophilus writes:
I understand the difference as a matter of grammar. I’m not sure I understand the difference as a matter of logic. Perhaps I have a wrong idea of what is meant by “self-evident”? I thought it meant “cannot be denied by any rational agent.”
Excellent question! Let us see if I am equal to answering it.
We were discussing whether or not the statement that the Natural Law exists is the same as that statement that all men must obey it.
The Natural Law is also called the Universal Moral Imperatives, or the Categorical Imperative, or the Golden Rule, that is, the body of moral imperatives all men know in their hearts must be obligatory. It is not manmade law, but it is apprehended intuitively by the reason, in so far as no one can deny such a rule applies to all rational agents are all times and under all conditions.
You asked “How is “I ought to obey all universal moral principles” not self-evident? That is what “universal” means.”
If I have correctly understood your question, it suffers from what is called the naturalistic fallacy: one cannot deduce an “ought” from an “is.”
A statement is called self evident when that it requires no evidence aside from itself for its proof.
In this sense, yes, such a statement ought not be denied by any rational agent. (It can be, but it ought not be.)
The difference, as a matter of logic, is that my argument states a correct and explicit syllogism, whereas your argument an enthymeme, a syllogism whose minor premise is merely assumed without being stated, that is tacit.
Moreover, your tacit assumption seems to be a circular argument, begging the question, assuming what you hope to prove.
Consider the following argument: given statement (1) “If universal moral imperatives exist, then they necessarily ought to be obeyed” is true; and the statement (2) “universal moral imperatives exist” is true; therefore the statement “universal moral imperatives ought to be obeyed” is true.
Statement (3) cannot be deduced from statement (2) if statement (1) is false.
And in any case, nothing is correctly called self evident unless the opposite is self contradictory. “Some statements are true” is a self evident statement because the opposite statement “No statements are true” is a paradox.
In this case “It is not necessarily true that all men are bound to obey the universal moral imperatives” does not, without more, seem to be self contradictory, unless the phrase “universal moral imperatives” means no more and no less than what all men are bound to obey: in which case, why, yes, the statement is self evident but only at the cost of being a tautology.
If there are universal moral imperatives, then all men would be bound to obey them, but if there are not, then not.
In this case, your tacit assumption is the naturalistic fallacy, that is, the assertion that facts create moral obligations without any prior moral obligation.
I am trying to put across a subtle yet startling conclusion: that moral reasoning underpins all other forms of reasoning, and are logically prior to those forms.
We are moral and moralizing beings whether we know it or not, acknowledge it or not.
Even to debate morality entails a moral decision, that is, whether to have an honest debate or a dishonest contest of mere rhetoric.
You and I agree that there is a pre-existing moral imperative, a duty, a command, to obey the moral imperatives of the universe.
We disagree that this is self evident. I submit that it is not.
Under your argument, the universal moral maxim might simply be a description, which carries no necessary imperative weight: merely because something is against the laws of England, does not mean I am bound. I am not English. I never swore fealty to the English crown.
Likewise, in a world without God, the universal moral maxim is merely a description. Just because something is against the laws of the universe, does not mean I am bound to obey.
The Gnostic, for example, is born against his will and without his consent, a spirit from outside the universe trapped and degraded like a butterfly in a jar, beating its wings against the glass.
For the Gnostic, he did not consent to the universe and did not swear fealty.
Hence the mere fact, by itself, without more, proving that adultery (for example) is against the laws written on the pillar of the universe were in fact written there, imposes on the Gnostic no imperative duty to obey.
An argument is needed to show if and why this stance is illogical. Indeed, in a world without God, I am not sure whether it is necessarily illogical or not. In any case, it is NOT self evident.
There is more here than grammar.
About John C Wright
John C. Wright is a practicing philosopher, a retired attorney, newspaperman, and newspaper editor, and a published author of science fiction. Once a Houyhnhnm, he was expelled from the august ranks of purely rational beings when he fell in love; but retains an honorary title.
